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Background.Dengue outbreaks are occurring with increasing frequency and intensity. Evidence-based epidemic preparedness and
effective response are now a matter of urgency. Therefore, we have analysed national and municipal dengue outbreak response
plans.Methods.Thirteen country plans fromAsia, Latin America and Australia, and one international plan were obtained from the
World Health Organization. The information was transferred to a data analysis matrix where information was extracted according
to predefined and emerging themes and analysed for scope, inconsistencies, omissions, and usefulness. Findings.Outbreak response
planning currently has a considerable number of flaws. Outbreak governance was weak with a lack of clarity of stakeholder roles.
Late timing of responses due to poor surveillance, a lack of combining routine data with additional alerts, and lack of triggers for
initiating the responseweakened the functionality of plans. Frequently an outbreakwas not defined, and early responsemechanisms
based on alert signals were neglected. There was a distinct lack of consideration of contextual influences which can affect how an
outbreak detection and response is managed.Conclusion.Amodel contingency plan for dengue outbreak prediction, detection, and
response may help national disease control authorities to develop their own more detailed and functional context specific plans.
1. Introduction
Dengue, amosquito-borne viral disease, is emerging as one of
the world’s most rapidly spreading and important infectious
diseases of the twenty first century [1] A somewhat different
disease scenario exists today, with all four viral serotypes
circulating in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, an estimated
3.6 billion people living in dengue endemic countries, and
over 50million dengue infections occurring annually [2].The
increasing global threat of dengue outbreaks in both endemic
and nonendemic regions has led to a focus on establishing an
effective outbreak response. A dengue outbreak response has
been defined as the sum of measures specifically addressing a
dengue outbreak, with the aim of reducing case fatality rates,
case number, and entomological parameters [3]. In addition
to this, in order to detect the outbreak, systematic surveillance
needs to be in place.
Emergency preparedness and anticipated response plan-
ning are an integral part of dengue control, yet this is
often neglected in dengue endemic countries [1]. Different
measures need to be implemented depending on the context
of dengue in the area. Thus, in endemic areas, the ability
to identify and coordinate an outbreak response should
be a priority, whereas in dengue free areas, strategies are
based on reacting to sporadic cases, risk indicators, or alert
signals. Some principles of outbreak response planning are
highlighted in the following.
Components of Emergency Outbreak Response Planning:
(i) clearly articulated aims, objectives, and scope,
(ii) a lead coordinating agency,
(iii) establishing an emergency response plan,
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(iv) organisational links with other agencies that have
direct responsibilities for implementation of the plan,
(v) specific roles and responsibilities of key agencies
documented,
(vi) costs and resources highlighted,
(vii) distribution of the plan to all response and supporting
agencies,
(viii) monitoring and evaluation framework,
(ix) clear triggers for the activation and deactivation of the
plan,
(x) objective criteria for defining an outbreak based on
specific local data,
(xi) multisectoral exercises to discuss and validate the
plan,
(xii) formal debriefing sessions to partners.
Despite the wide variety of different interventions in
place, there is the scant literature evaluating outbreak
response activities and there are no evidence-based universal
strategies for management of dengue epidemics that can be
used as the basis for the development of context specific out-
break response plans. Studies evaluating outbreak responses
have been difficult to interpret as they generally describe
a wide range of interventions implemented in different ways,
and the available literature focuses largely on epidemiological
surveillance or vector control [3]. The lack of evidence-
based outbreak response strategies led to a global research
agenda set up by the Scientific Working Group at WHO in
2006 recommending case studies of national programmes
to identify factors leading to success or failure of dengue
prevention and control programmes [4]. It has also been
recommended that future research should compare national
and international policies in emergency response plans to
identify the common interventions currently described [3].
The aim of this research was to contribute to an improved
response to dengue outbreaks through the comparison and
analysis of existing strategies and dengue outbreak response
plans.
2. Methods
2.1. Data Collection. This research is part of a programme
funded by the European Commission and coordinated by the
TDR-WHO (Special Programme for Research and Training
in Tropical Diseases), intending to identify strategies in
dengue outbreak detection and control in order to improve
future responses. The comparison of country outbreak
response plans involved the acquisition of grey literature
from governments and organisations which had existing
outbreak response plans.The literature was obtained through
the World Health Organisation (Department of Neglected
Tropical Diseases). The inclusion criteria consisted of any
regional, national, provincial, or local dengue policy that
contained details on outbreak response strategies, from any
source, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Three of the
documents, originally in Spanish/Portuguese, were trans-
lated into English for this study. A systematic screening of
material allowed the exclusion of incomplete documents,
documents with no details of outbreak activities, and draft
strategies comprising of only recommendations for a dengue
outbreak response. Limitations of the methodology included
the following: the sampling of plans was largely out of the
researchers’ control in that they were provided by the WHO;
there may be a number of functioning plans that were not
obtained, particularly in other national/local languages; and
the English translation of Spanish/Portuguese texts may have
led to misinterpretation of the information; thus, some infor-
mation may have been missed or lost. Due to the diversity
of plans to be compared, collectively obtaining information
under headings was sometimes difficult, and occasionally,
inferences had to be made to ensure comparability.
2.2. Analysis. The country dengue outbreak plans were ana-
lysed using a data matrix. A framework approach was used,
whereby information was extracted using predefined themes,
but additionally emerging themes were added so that if
one plan revealed additional information about a pertinent
component of the outbreak, it could be added to the data
codes and previously read plans scrutinized to confirm
the absence of this information [5]. A critical analysis of
the grey literature was the method of analysis, whereby
plan structure and content were appraised for clarity, detail,
applicability, instructional capacity, and usefulness to public
health providers. International recommendations were also
taken into account [6].
3. Results
Fourteen documents were obtained containing details of the
activities implemented in relation to a dengue outbreak. Due
to the relative paucity of specific outbreak response plans, the
documents reviewed were heterogeneous in their approach.
Of the fourteen plans, nine were outbreak response plans;
however, two of these were guides for all infectious disease
outbreaks that included an annex on dengue, leaving seven
dengue specific outbreak control plans. Of the others, four
plans documented control of dengue in the interepidemic
period, with some outbreak responsemeasures included.One
of the plans was a “best practice” set of recommendations for
control of dengue.
3.1. OutbreakManagement and Stakeholders. Outbreak plan-
ning must ensure that governance over the response is
present, particularly through highlighting the stakeholders to
be involved, providing details of monitoring of the response,
ensuring that transparent risk communication is in place,
and allowing for human resource preparedness planning.
Of the fourteen plans, ten included a section on the key
stakeholders involved in dengue control, with an additional
two informally highlighting stakeholder roles. There was
great diversity in the stakeholders involved in the outbreak
response, often depending on service providers in each
country. Documented sectors the plans stated to be involved
included entomologists (4/14), the environment sector (6/14),
non-governmental organisations (5/14), private healthcare
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facilities and additional private institutions (5/14), civil soci-
eties (8/14), and the education sector (8/14). Despite all of the
plans stating the importance of vector control in an outbreak,
the majority failed to document that entomologists or vector
control stakeholders should be involved. Only six of the
fourteen plans contained a formal section on the intersectoral
approach in the dengue outbreak response. Of the fourteen
plans, ten recommended the establishment of a specific team
to control a dengue outbreak, with eight of the ten plans
documenting specifically who should be in this team. The
teammembers varied depending on the key stakeholders that
already functioned in healthcare delivery, disaster control,
and interepidemic dengue prevention. However, some core
members were recommended by a number of plans: clini-
cians/nurses (5/14), laboratory representatives (5/14), public
health staff (5/14), local government or leaders (4/14), vector
biologists (3/14), and environmental representatives (3/14).
Despite this, the documentation of an intersectoral approach
to a dengue outbreak was weak in relation to functionality.
The information provided on the roles and responsibilities
of the stakeholders was often minimal for an outbreak,
with some plans simply stating their presence. Some plans
took a very top-down approach, whereby the ministries to
be involved were documented; others took a bottom up
approach, recommending local stakeholders.
Of the fourteen plans, thirteen reported monitoring
and/or evaluating a dengue outbreak response, which
involved monitoring of cases throughout the outbreak (8/14),
and monitoring entomological indices (6/14). There was
often a lack of clarity as to how monitoring and evaluation
should be conducted during an outbreak, with few plans
recommending a combination of epidemiological data and
entomological indicators to ensure successful control (2/14).
Risk communication is a prominent part of an outbreak
response, and many documents stated the need to regularly
update the public on the outbreak status (9/14), focusing
on communication through the media (8/14). There was
little documentation of specific risk communication to clini-
cians and healthcare workers (2/14). Documentation of how,
when, and through whom risk communication should occur
was weak. Ten plans acknowledged the need for human
resource preparedness for a dengue outbreak. Recommended
strategies included staff training during the interepidemic
period (9/14) emergency training to be provided during
an epidemic (2/14), and staff recruitment from other areas
(6/14). In the majority of the plans, there was a lack of
detail specifying who should be trained or recruited, or
how this training would take place, by whom, and how
often. Other strategies advocated in individual plans included
maintaining an emergency staff roster, maintaining a list of
unemployed nurses and healthcare assistants, recruitment
from civil societies and the private sector, and mobilisation
from the Emergency Operations Committee.
3.2. Surveillance. Twelve of the plans included information
about dengue surveillance. All twelve predominantly docu-
mented the use of a passive surveillance system to detect an
outbreak, reliant on reporting from healthcare professionals
to a local or central unit (12/14). One of the main functions
of an effective surveillance system is to highlight early an
increase in case number in order to identify an epidemic
and initiate prompt action. The passive system is dependent
on case reporting by clinicians, yet half of the plans did not
state that it is necessary for all health units to report (7/14).
Only half of the plans stated how reporting would take place
(7/14), with a significant lack of electronic systems (2/14). Just
under half of the plans did not statewho should be notified on
suspicion or confirmation of a dengue case (6/14).Theprocess
of analysis of dengue case data (particularly transfer from a
local to a central level) was included in a few plans (5/14),
with only one plan stating that analysis would occur at the
local level.
Enhanced surveillance methods were either documented
for the interepidemic period, or to be introduced when an
outbreak is suspected or confirmed. Collectively, enhanced
surveillance strategies were sporadically documented in
the plans. Active surveillance was the most commonly
documented strategy to be introduced (7/14), with some
plans specifically recommending sentinel surveillance (4/14).
Other approaches included syndromic surveillance (2/14),
mortality surveillance (2/14), and severe case surveillance
(2/14). Laboratory support was documented to be a key part
of the confirmation of dengue cases (either confirming a
proportion or all of cases) in twelve of the fourteen plans.
However, only a few plans documented exactly what tests
should be performed (9/14), at what exact stage in the illness
(5/14), and the number of tests required to substantiate
an outbreak when resources are limited (7/14). Logistical
considerations were only occasionally taken into account
(5/14). Isolating the serotype and referral to a reference
laboratory for quality assurance was also documented (6/14
and 9/14, resp.).
3.3. Outbreak Definition, Alerts, and Verification. In order for
an outbreak response to be initiated in the first instance, an
outbreak should be clearly defined. Of the eight plans that
document a definition, there was use of both case numbers
(4/14) and surveillance thresholds (4/14) to define the out-
break. In addition, in order to react early to an outbreak, a
few plans recommend alert triggers that may inform a health
system or government to the threat (8/14). Epidemiological
(5/14), entomological (2/14), laboratory (2/14), and geograph-
ical alerts (1/14) were recommended. Some plans document
parameters that should trigger enhancement of preventative
or routinemeasures, in a so-called alert phase. No plan stated
the use of climate data to predict an outbreak. Of the plans
that stated alerts for an outbreak, some documented actions
to be taken, such as more data collection or the introduction
of active surveillance, but this was still missing in some plans
which compromised the meaning of alerts stated (5/14).
An outbreak investigation was recommended to take
place by most of the plans (10/14), yet the process varied
significantly, dependent on endemicity levels, previous expe-
rience with outbreaks, and resources available. Common ele-
ments of recommended outbreak investigations were obtain-
ing a travel history of the index case (6/14), filling out the case
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report form (6/14), conducting vector surveillance (8/14), and
active case finding (8/14), all of which aim to confirm the
case and the outbreak. There was poor documentation of the
stakeholders responsible for investigating the outbreak (5/14),
and less than half of the plans advocated a risk assessment for
dengue outbreaks to be performed (5/14).
3.4. Outbreak Response. All plans documented vector control
measures that should be implemented in an outbreak; all
stated a role for larval control in the form of source reduction
efforts (14/14), the majority stating a role for chemical control
(9/14), and a minority for biological control (5/14). Ten of
the plans advocated adult mosquito control, predominantly
through chemical methods involving the space spraying of
insecticide (8/14 outdoor spraying, 3/14 indoor spraying).
Nonchemical mosquito control methods were rarely doc-
umented (2/14). The major gaps in vector-control docu-
mentation included who is responsible for such actions,
when and for how long vector control should be performed,
mapping of the area that needs to be covered around the
case residence, and monitoring of the vector population. The
plans often focused on environmental larval control during
the interepidemic period but emphasised chemical mosquito
control during the outbreak, usually in the form of space
spraying.Themore robust plans stated context specific details
of how larval control would be deployed. The community
(4/14), government teams (5/14), and NGOs (2/14) were all
mentioned in different plans as being responsible for source
reduction.
All plans recommended some form of community en-
gagement during a dengue outbreak, with the focus on com-
munity education (13/14). A minority of the plans focused
on direct mobilisation of the community in order to either
spread educational messages to or promote destruction and
prevention of mosquito breeding sites (6/14). Some good
practices have been identified from the plans. At a govern-
mental level, this includes targeting specific human resources
to help in an outbreak, organising community participation
schemes, and coordinating mass media campaigns. At the
level of the community, particular actions include meetings
with leaders or social representatives, community mobil-
isation via advertising, and making individuals aware of
the responsibility they possess to aid in outbreak activities.
Three types of educational message have been identified:
(a) preventative measures that focus on the interruption of
dengue mosquito breeding sites, (b) protective measures to
prevent exposure to mosquitoes, and (c) encouragement of
health seeking behaviour. Rarely did a plan include all three
of the messages to be communicated to the public.
Health service management is a crucial consideration
when contingency planning, yet this was relatively neglected
in the plans, with only half of the plans documenting how
the structure of health services should be considered in an
outbreak (7/14). An outline of how a health service would
adapt to an influx of patients was sporadically documented
in only the more robust plans. Some strategies documented
included the implementation of an effective triage system
(4/14), the establishment of an emergency room (2/14),
the identification of additional facilities to be used (3/14),
preparation and mobilisation of resources (6/14), and trans-
mission control in hospitals (7/14).
4. Discussion
Outbreak response planning has been identified as a way to
augment engagement of partners, build capacity, and develop
infrastructure, providing operational links to ensure a struc-
tured and coordinated response [7]. The current thinking
in outbreak response planning in public health recommends
that outbreak planning needs to be locally adapted depending
on the presence or absence of public health infrastructure
for each individual disease [8]. In this review, just one of
the 14 plans provided an holistic and comprehensive picture
of how the surveillance system and response plan should be
organised in order to (a) detect a dengue outbreak at an early
stage through clearly defined and validated alert signals, (b)
exactly define that a dengue outbreak has started, and (c)
organise an early response to the warning signals detected,
or a late response when an outbreak has been verified [9]. By
combining the information from the different plans analysed
in this paper and adding information fromWHOdocuments,
a clearer picture emerges about the essential elements of a
comprehensive outbreak response plan.
4.1. Outbreak Management. Control activities for a dengue
outbreak need to be multisectoral, multidisciplinary, and
multilevel, requiring environmental, political, social, and
medical inputs to be coordinated so that productive activities
of one sector are not negated by the lack of commitment from
another [3].This is required at all levels of surveillance, trans-
mission control, and clinical management. Documenting the
relevant stakeholders who should be involved in an outbreak
response, both at a local level with regard to implementation,
and at a higher political level with regard to decision-making,
is crucial in order to coordinate the response. Yet, there
is often a neglect of documentation of stakeholder roles in
outbreak response plans, leading to a failure to acknowledge
the importance of intersectoral communication, a failure to
recognise capacity, a lack of appropriate delegation, and a
lack of accountability with regard to activities. The literature
highlights how the coordination of a diverse set of sectors
and social groups has faced challenges. Often mechanisms
do not exist to guarantee intersectoral compliance with a
regulatory framework in terms of financial and operational
participation, thus weakening the outbreak response, due to
delegation to stakeholders with poor operational organisa-
tion [10]. Recognition of where capacity lies is thus far more
important than encouraging universal sectors to be involved
in an outbreak response. Nevertheless, this review has found
even sectors that do have capacity are often not documented
to be involved in managing an outbreak response. Current
planning focuses on “what” should be implemented, without
considering “who” shall be responsible, with a distinct lack of
functional detail of the roles of stakeholders.
Acknowledgment of the additional human resources that
will be required in a dengue outbreak, both in clinical
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management of cases and in transmission control, is relatively
well covered in outbreak response planning. Redistribution
of staff and upscaling of roles of existing staff is one method
of ensuring adequate staff numbers, whereby medical per-
sonnel may be required to work longer hours and move to
other locations [11]. Yet, the overworking and consequent
demotivation of public health staff may be a barrier in a
dengue outbreak response, and plans may fail to take into
consideration the difficulties facing redistribution of relevant
trained professionals in practice [12]. The benefit of staff
training for an outbreak in the interepidemic period has been
established in the literature and in this plan analysis, and
experience has led to a recognition of the additional use
of hands-on training during a dengue outbreak [3, 13, 14].
Thus, investment in human resources must come prior to the
outbreak. This may be difficult for countries that have weak
governments. Outbreak response planning documentation
should include a section specifying activities that should be
performed in the interepidemic period in preparation for
an outbreak, particularly related to outbreak preparedness as
opposed to just preventative control.
4.2. Surveillance. In an early literature review of epidemio-
logical dengue surveillance, it was found that despite 46 of
the 56 major dengue endemic countries in the world having
functioning dengue surveillance systems, only four of these
were robust enough for epidemic prediction [15, 16]. The
literature highlights that the weaknesses of surveillance in
predicting an outbreak continue to compromise the efforts
of health systems to identify an outbreak in a timely manner.
The initiation of this process has proved to be weak, with the
underreporting of cases undermining the ability of surveil-
lance to substantiate an outbreak and gaps in reporting being
often identified, for example, whereby some surveillance
systems only report dengue cases in children [17, 18]. The
plans predominantly highlighted a dependence on weak
disjointed passive surveillance systems. Indeed, there is often
fragmented reporting, inadequate methods of notification,
and weakness in the transfer of case information from local
to central level for analysis, with a lack of local use of analysis
data. This may lead to neglect of an immediate response,
especially if a number of intermediaries are in place as has
been identified [19]. It may be suggested that although a
coordinated response from local government may be difficult
in some settings, the use of local data for risk communication
to the public, clear reporting flowcharts in place, a functional
feedback system, data analysis also at the lowest possible level,
and capacity building in surveillance at the periphery may
be crucial. A lack of accountability at a local level needs
to be challenged in order to successfully shorten the time
delay between the onset of and response to an epidemic.
A functional national surveillance system is paramount in
outbreak response andmust be incorporated into planning in
order to target all the above weaknesses that currently exist.
There is also a need for a more effective strategy in enhanced
surveillance taking into account seasonal trends, something
which is currently neglected in relation to outbreak detection.
Laboratory surveillance needs to be strengthened for
outbreak preparedness and response, and all but two of
the plans stated a need for laboratory facilities, with quality
control being crucial. Yet it has been found that many
countries do not have the facilities in place to process such
tests in a timeframe that is conducive to case confirmation
for public health intervention [20]. If countries do not have
such facilities in place, working with clinical case definitions
may need more prominence in outbreak response planning.
In particular, the value of clinical identification of warning
signs for severe dengue, and knowing how to triage patients
in the absence of laboratory test results may be crucial. It
may be argued that unless there are details of which tests
need to be performed at which point in the clinical illness,
recommending laboratory testing may actually impede good
clinical management and identification of an outbreak.
4.3. Outbreak Definition, Alerts, and Verification. A first
and fundamental gap in outbreak response planning is the
lack of clarity offered when deciding what an “outbreak”
actually is. A significant proportion of the plans analysed
does not provide an outbreak definition. Therefore countries
are working with plans that do not explicitly state when
their plan should be implemented. Outbreak definitions that
fail to relate cases in time and place may cause problems
for dengue endemic countries because a certain number of
cases will be occurring all the time and will usually increase
during the rainy season.There is a requirement for laboratory
confirmation in some of the outbreak definitions which may
increase the delay in outbreak verification. The advantage
of laboratory testing is that it allows diagnosis to be more
specific, which is especially of use in highly endemic settings
[21]. Terminology used, such as a “cluster of cases” may be
ambiguous and lead to discrepancies in what stakeholders
envisage as an outbreak. Often outbreak definitions rely on
the timely analysis of surveillance data to establish that cases
are above a threshold, yet surveillance systems are often
incomplete, inaccurate, and slow, which undermines this
process.
Additional outbreak alerts, besides passive surveillance,
have been proposed to be of great importance in areas where
disease surveillance may be weak, or dengue transmission
is endemic [22, 23]. Alerts are documented in a number
of the plans, yet no single marker other than dengue case
incidence stands out as an outbreak alert. Epidemiological
parameters such as an increase in deaths, an increase in
proportion of negative malarial cases among febrile patients,
and an increase in hospital admissionsmay be easy to identify
if routine data is collected. Alert signals based on laboratory
informationmay provide a rapid alert if facilities are available.
However, with regard to entomological surveillance alerts,
questions have been generated concerning its effectiveness
in predicting outbreaks particularly because the thresholds
are unclear and may be highly dependent on local factors
[24]. Few plans document that a rising case number should
be considered as an early warning indicator, unless the
number exceeds the threshold for a full outbreak response.
This “crisis mentality” creates a dichotomous systemwhereby
alerts split dengue activity into “outbreak” and “no outbreak”
without any circumstances in between [15, 16]. This raises
the question whether there is an opportunity for alerts to
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be based on a scale, so that if case number rises above
a pre-defined alert threshold, some action can be taken
which may increase capacity for outbreak control (i.e., an
early response or initial response). It may be argued that a
false alert due to low specificity of an alert signal may not
waste resources if the correct public health interventions are
implemented and preparednessmeasures taken, and thismay
be a way of utilising additional signals without deploying
a full outbreak response [21]. An example of a tool to use
is given in Figure 1. The alert tool will be characterized by
thresholds based on the country’s surveillance system taking
into account seasonal trends, and in combination with other
signals, the country deems appropriate, and contextualized
depending on a country’s resources. It is suggested that this
tool needs to focus on the formation of readily identifiable
triggers for a given country, be specific, and include a link
to specific activities to be coordinated at the point of alert
identification. This may aid the identification of alerts and
allow verification at a higher level and decision making
regarding subsequent actions. In addition, it will provide
clarity to all those coordinated in dengue control what and
when actions need be performed and should be directly
related to outbreak definition in a context specific plan.
Currently, the transparency of this process is not present
in outbreak response planning. This suggestion has been
supported in the literature. Badurdeen et al. found that
country experiences suggested that dengue outbreaks should
be split into “phases” whereby tailored responses should be
in place [25]. These phases include an initial response, an
early response, an early response in clinical settings, and an
emergency response. The algorithm in Figure 1 goes one step
further in that it accounts for both alerts and related actions.
It may be argued that without investment in all areas of the
algorithm below, splitting a response into different levels may
be aspirational.
4.4. Outbreak Response. Despite the evidence that outdoor
fogging in national programmes has usually little impact
on dengue transmission, mainly due to inadequate delivery,
numerous country plans reported fogging was a key strategy
[26]. It has been argued that fogging is often politically
motivated, as it is highly visible and conveys the message
that the government is taking action [6, 18]. One of the
arguments used to justify the use of fogging is that resource
poor settings face difficulties designing and implementing
alternative vector-control strategies, particularly in large
urban populations [12]. Analysis of the contingency plans
suggests that source reduction using the community must
be considered as a simple yet crucial outbreak response
activity, yet community based-interventions depend solely
on how engaged the community is and/or how behavioural
change can be achieved [27]. It has been recommended
that multifaceted interventions are more effective than single
interventions, and therefore a combination of government
commitment, authority involvement, and community mobil-
isation is best placed in order to target all possible breeding
sites [28].This needs to be clarified in future planning in order
to take the focus away from fogging.
Good clinical case management in an outbreak has been
crucial in reducing dengue case fatality from 10–20% to
less than 1% in some countries over the past two decades
[29]. Currently, it has been found that hospital contingency
measures are rarely accounted for in outbreak response
planning, despite the fact that the effects of a dengue outbreak
in terms of mortality and morbidity will be determined by
these measures. It has been found that the key areas that
need accounting for in outbreak response planning are stock
management, human resources and clinical management of
cases, and triage systems and space for an influx of patients
[25]. Some of the suggestions from individual plans of ways
to account for the strain on hospital services include an
emergency dengue unit or dengue emergency room to be
formed, or a triage referral system to be in place with
clear communication as to how to provide adequate medical
treatment in emergencies and when resources are low. It has
been found that increasing surge capacity may be as simple
as using mattresses on the floor, foldable beds, or more than
one patient per bed [25]. However, it may be argued that these
strategies may still be last resort options in crisis situations.
The plans that include additional facilities in place such as
opening of public places to care for patients, such as town
halls or places of worship, and those that include systems as
opposed to just resources to account for an influx of patients,
are the most feasible and structured contingency measures.
This is currently a large weakness in outbreak planning. This
plan review has identified a number of different ways of
obtaining staff for clinical management of dengue patients,
as highlighted in the discussion above. In addition, the best
ways to achieve successful training, especially in countries
with weak governance or poor healthcare management, may
be through hands-on training during ward rounds and case
conferences [3]. The importance of emergency resources
and funding for an outbreak response including clinical
supplies has been highlighted as an important element of
preparedness and response planning, and thismust be crucial
in future outbreak response planning to fill the gap that
currently exists [1]. It can be recommended that all outbreak
response planning should account for early responses in
clinical settings, with particular focus on circulation and
familiarisation of staff with the management of dengue, staff
training and engagement of other authorities, and the private
sector to enhance surge capacity in clinical settings [25].
4.5. Overall Limitations of Preparedness Planning. From the
breakdown of the plans, strengths and weaknesses in dengue
outbreak response planning have been identified. Despite
all but one of the plans being country specific, the lack
of actual context specific input may hinder the use of the
plans. Many of the plans provide generic information that is
deemed relatively weak in relation to implementation. Some
plans clearly split the activities that shall be performed in the
interepidemic period and during the outbreak, yet a frequent
weakness is that there is a lack of clarity in identifying
specific outbreak strategies. Some country plans advocate
up scaling of preventative interventions when case numbers
increase, with a number of outbreak specific procedures being
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Figure 1: Alert signals of a dengue outbreak and possible Interventions.
neglected, such as an outbreak investigation, risk communi-
cation, health system management for hospital admissions,
and human resource preparedness.
Outbreak governance, disease surveillance, outbreak ver-
ification, and response initiation have been identified to be as
crucial to an effective outbreak response as the interventions
actually deployed to control the outbreak. The lack of recog-
nition of these initial additional elements of the outbreak
response collectively has led to a current lack of consistency
in outbreak response planning. An additional limitation in
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contingency planning is the lack of communication between
one stage of an outbreak and another, whereby the disciplines
of surveillance, investigation, and response are separated
concepts. In particular, this concerns the lack of continuity
between surveillance, outbreak alerts, outbreak confirmation
based on the outbreak definition, and outbreak declaration.
This is compounded by the minimal documented account-
ability for each intervention so that plans do not define a body
or person that is in charge of certain activities.
5. Conclusions
The complexity of dengue dynamics and the multifaceted
response that is demanded create a strong argument as to
why dengue outbreak response planning requires contextual
details, service structure considerations, and a capacity analy-
sis all to be taken into account in order for success in outbreak
control. Only through organic policy development will this
process truly be viable. Nevertheless, this research highlights
the need for a model contingency plan for dengue outbreak
prediction, detection, and response as a framework to help
countries develop their own more detailed plan in light of
the numerous gaps and profound weaknesses identified. Par-
ticular areas to be developed in outbreak response planning
are outbreak management and stakeholder collaborations,
surveillance strategies that include alert thresholds for when
action should be initiated, and the “who, when, how, and
why” of outbreak response activities as opposed to just
the “what”. In light of the lack of evidence of alert signals
and surveillance thresholds identified in collaborating the
country outbreak response material, it is also clear that
operational research is required to test the validity of alert
signals and thresholds and to identify the most cost-effective
interventions that may be implemented during both an
“early” response and “late” response.
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